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ABSTRACT

Despite the potential of micro-payment systems very few systems have been successful. Micro-payment markets exhibit twosided network externalities and the business models for these markets are not very well understood. By using a parsimonious
game theoretic model, this paper studies factors affecting the existence of a market for micro-payment systems, how the users
and merchants choose their acceptance levels, and how a profit maximizing system provider sets the prices under the
presence of two-sided network effects. We find that there is a ‘survival mass’ of merchants and users for the market to exist
and a ‘critical mass’ for the acceptance levels to take off and remain stable. There is also a lower bound for the user and
merchant demands. The conditions for the existence of the market are derived. We find the non-intuitive result that lowering
the user-side adoption cost will actually hurt the chances for the micro-payment market to exist. Anecdotal evidence supports
this. We also find that to achieve full acceptance levels, the system provider needs to subsidize both users and merchants,
which is not feasible in practice.
Keywords

Network Externalities, Two-sided Market, Micro-payment Systems, Smart Card Technology, Electronic Cash, Game Theory
1. INTRODUCTION

The idea of having a cashless world has long been around. The costs of handling cash are high compared to that of electronic
money. Printing, distributing and controlling cash are estimated to cost a developed economy 0.75% of annual GDP and an
emerging economy 1% to 2% (Banker Middle East, 2003). Social savings of using electronic micro-payment means over
cash are substantial.
Given the huge potential savings electronic micro-payment can bring about, there is much room for profits. Electronic micropayment is also essential for all kinds of electronic and mobile commerce. This further enhances the incentives for firms to
enter this market. Consequently, major credit card operators and financial institutions had been trying to capitalize on this
business throughout the 90s. Initiatives like Mondex and Visa Cash (Westland, 1998; Westland, Kwok, Shu, Kwok, and Ho,
1997) got little success. In an early pilot test (Hove, 2000), the acceptance levels of both Mondex and Visa Cash were
disappointing.
The Octopus card was originally a fare-payment smart card for the Hong Kong passenger transportation system. A joint
venture firm called Creative Star Limited was formed by the five major public transportation operators to develop the system.
It was introduced to the public in 1997, targeting a public transportation market with 10 million passenger journeys per day
and total daily transactions valuing over 2.5 million dollars (Poon and Chau, 2001). A critical mass was quickly gained and
the Octopus card system is now growing to support non-transportation micro-payment transactions too. With over 7 million
cards been issued, it is now the closest thing to an electronic-cash system anywhere in the world (Yoon, 2001).
Success of the Octopus card has attracted a lot of attention. There are many similar applications in other parts of the world –
Singapore, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Austria are just a few examples (CPSS Survey, 2001). The Octopus
card is simply the most successful among them.
The overwhelming success of the Octopus card is surprising. Other options (Mondex, Visa Cash) are equally or even better
supported but have failed to attain a comparable level of acceptance. Technically, the Octopus card is not more secure (Hong

Proceedings of the Tenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, New York, New York, August 2004

2507

See-To et. al

Economics of Electronic Micro-payment Systems

Kong Economic Times, 2000). It also does not have a gigantic client base compared with Visa and Mondex, which are
supported by Visa Card and Master Card respectively.
The micro-payment market is a two-sided market: involving users and merchants, two very different parties. This unique
market structure has two important implications. First, the demand for a micro-payment system must come jointly from users
and merchants. Second, system providers face the well-known chicken and egg dilemma: users want merchants on board and
vice versa. The business models of these two-sided markets are not very well understood and this may lead to the mixed
results of various micro-payment initiatives.
To investigate the business model implications of such a two-sided market structure, we study factors affecting the existence
of a market for micro-payment systems, how the users and merchants choose their acceptance levels, and how the profit
maximizing system provider sets the prices, by examining network externalities that arise from the usage of such systems.
Normally, network externalities derive directly from the number of users in the network. Telecommunication networks are a
common example. Network externalities of electronic payment systems are different - the value of the system to users
depends on the number of merchants adopting the system and vice versa. We study the following research questions by
developing an analytical model: What determines the user and merchant acceptance levels? What are the factors affecting the
existence of a market for micro-payment system? What are the pricing guidelines for system providers?
Our findings have important managerial implications. We find that there is a “survival mass” of merchants and users for the
market to exist and a “critical mass” for the acceptance levels to take off and remain stable. There is also a lower bound for
the user and merchant demands. The conditions for the existence of the market are derived. We find the non-intuitive result
that lowering the user-side adoption cost will actually hurt the chances for the micro-payment market to exist. An early pilot
test on Visa Cash and Mondex (Hove, 2000) supports this result. Also we find that to achieve full acceptance levels, the
system provider needs to subsidize both users and merchants.
The remaining parts of this paper proceed as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews previous studies related to electronic payment
systems, network externalities and multiproduct pricing. Section 3 describes the model used. Section 4 analyses the
interaction between users and merchants. Section 5 lays out the analysis of the pricing decisions in a monopoly market.
Section 6 concludes and discusses the results, and identifies future research directions.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW

When the value of a product depends on the number of users, the product exhibits network externalities. When the value
increases with the number of users, there are positive network externalities. Consider a telephone network. The network is
more valuable when there are more users with whom one can communicate. Network externalities could be negative too.
When there are too many cars, i.e. users, on the road, undesirable traffic jams occur.
Network externalities form a broad stream of economic literature. Economides (1996) provides an excellent survey.
Researches have shown that network externalities have significant impacts on firm strategies and consumer behaviors. The
failure of Dvorak Simplified Keyboard is a classic example (David, 1985). Studies in the spreadsheet market demonstrate
how network effects cause higher prices and set common standards (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996; Gandal, 1994). In
studies of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) networks, Wang and Seidmann (1995) show the presence of both positive and
negative network externalities. Riggins, Kriebel, and Mukhopadhyay (1994) investigate how a buyer can attract suppliers to
its EDI network while Barua and Lee (1997) study how subsidizing suppliers can increase the adoption of an EDI system.
Hove (2000) illustrated that network externality and communication channel are the two most important factors governing
the adoption decision for an electronic payment system of users and merchants. Firms can use communication channels to
disseminate information in their favor so that users and merchants are more willing to adopt by having a better understanding
of the benefits of using the electronic payment system.
However, when it comes to network externality, things are complex. There is a joint demand requirement and a chicken-andegg dilemma. Merchants will not adopt the system unless there is sufficient number of users. At the same time, users will not
consider the system until there are enough adopted merchants. Figure 1 depicts this market structure.
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Figure 1: Interdependence of users and merchants

Thus, the value of an electronic payment system, in the eyes of users, increases as more merchants join in. On the other hand,
the value of the system in the eyes of merchants increases as more users adopt. This dilemma makes the market dynamics
complicated and there are no guidelines for system providers to set their pricing strategies. The determinants of acceptance
level in such markets are also not very well understood.
In a previous research, these types of interdependent network effects are called as two-sided network externalities (Yoo,
Choudhary and Mukhopadhyay, 2002). We adopt this term. The research of two-sided network externalities studied B2B
marketplace. The context of electronic payment systems differs from this in three important ways. First, users and merchants
are two clearly separate entities while a participant of a B2B marketplace could act as both a buyer and a seller. Second, we
have no negative network effects for the market of electronic micro-payment systems. B2B marketplace could exhibit
significant negative network effects due to competitions for businesses among participants. Finally, when there is zero
acceptance on any side of the market, an electronic payment system has no value while a B2B marketplace can still generate
values by providing information.
Rochet and Tirole (2001) investigate the price allocation and welfare implications in two-sided market competition. Their
work linked up network economics and multiproduct pricing together by analyzing the price allocation question in the
presence of two-sided network externalities. Their model is of very general nature and provides valuable starting points in
analyzing two-sided markets. However, issues important to our context, like the asymmetry nature of merchant side and user
side, are not considered.
We apply game theory to examine the non-cooperative outcomes of a monopoly market in which the system provider,
merchants and users each act in a way to maximize their own payoffs. With two-sided network externalities in effect, the
strategic interaction among the three players is our focus in this analysis. Game theory is the right tool for such multi-agent
decision problems.
3. MODEL SPECIFICATIONS

Consider a market with three parties: a system provider, a number of merchants, and a number of users. Users and merchants
trade with each other. These trades are settled with transactions of small amount. Each small amount trade is one transaction
in our model. The Octopus card system is an example of a micro-payment based market – the joint venture firm is the system
provider, the different public transportation operators are the merchants and the general public are the users. A transaction
takes place when a user pays a public transportation operator with either cash or the Octopus card.
A two-stage game is used to model the market. The system provider, users and merchants are the players. Each player knows
everyone’s payoff. In stage one, the system provider offers a pair of prices Pm and Pu to the merchants and users
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respectively to use the system. In stage two, both users and merchants observe the offered prices and then move (decide
whether to adopt) simultaneously. The resulting proportion of adopted users and merchants are Du and Dm respectively.
Hence, we have 0 ≤ Du , Dm ≤ 1 .
3.1 User preference

Users are heterogeneous in the number of transactions made with the merchants. A user type corresponds to the number of

transactions he/she makes. Two users are of the same type if they make the same number of transactions. A user i does a
certain number of transactions θ i q . The type of a user i is denoted by θ i and we assume that θ i distribute uniformly over
[0,1]. The transaction frequency of a particular user market is captured by q . For instance, a transportation market has a
much higher transaction frequency (higher q ) than a retail one.

There are several benefits an adopted user can get each time he/she uses the micro-payment system vis-à-vis cash. For
example, the user can decrease the time needed for the payment process. The process of payment is also simplified in most
cases. For instance, when paying for transportation fares in Hong Kong, an Octopus user can decrease the time for payment
and avoid the troubles to take cash or some stored value cards out of the wallet.
Time and convenience constitutes a major benefit of adopting and using an electronic payment system. This comes from the
contactless nature of the card in most cases. Technology plays a dominant role in realizing the system benefits. All benefits
U

per transaction are summarized and represented by b .
Researches suggested that the nature of transactions is important to user preference (Hove, 2000). Some types of transactions
can create higher values for users. Unattended point-of-sales applications are one example. These are uses for which cash is
truly inconvenient (Clemons, Croson, and Weber, 1996; Weaver 1998). Under this model, these considerations can be easily
handled by using different values for

bU .

By observing prices Pu and Pm , users form an expectation on merchant acceptance. At equilibrium, this expectation equals
the resulting merchant acceptance Dm (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). The more the number of merchants adopting the system, the
more different places an adopted user can use the system. In short, users benefits from having more merchants on board and
prefer a higher Dm . In particular, users cannot use the system with no merchant adopting it. Consequently, a user who makes

θi q

transactions gets a gross benefit Dmθ i qb .
U

The gross benefit Dmθ i qb

U

is totally dependent on the network effect of the merchant market to a user i . Therefore, the

intensity of the network effect is determined by the type of the user. In other words, the user’s frequency of using the micropayment system defines his/her intensity of the network effect.
If a user decides to adopt the electronic payment system, he/she needs to learn how to use the micro-payment system.
Denotes this learning cost by φ , which is assumed the same for all users. System design features will be one important
determinant for the learning cost. For example, using a contactless smart card is considered to be simpler and easier to learn
than using a magnetic card.
U

Summarizing all the above, the net surplus of a particular user i is:

U i = Dmθ i qbU − Pu − φ U
if he/she decides to adopt the electronic payment system. Otherwise, the user gets the reservation utility. Without loss of
generality, we assume a zero reservation utility. Therefore, we have U i = 0 if the user decides not to adopt the electronic
U

payment system. We further denote the overall user-side system benefits qb , which partly due to the transaction frequency

q , and partly due to the technology bU , by BU . Obviously, a user will adopt the electronic payment system if and only if
U i = Dmθ i BU − Pu − φ U ≥ 0
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3.2 Merchant preference

Similarly, merchants are heterogeneous in number of transactions makes with users and the number of transactions a
merchant makes defines its type. A merchant j makes ϑ j n transactions. Hence the type of a merchant j is represented by

ϑj

Assume that ϑ j is distributed uniformly over [0,1]. The transaction frequency of the merchant market is captured by n .

The merchant expects a user demand

Du .
M

For each transaction, a merchant can get b benefits. These mainly come from the savings generated by reducing the needs
to handle cash and decreasing frauds. For the passenger transportation sector in Hong Kong, processing of coin payments
could cost up to 4% of the fares collected (Poon and Chau, 2001). The performance of the underlying technology will be a
major factor on how much savings can be generated.
To adopt and use the micro-payment system, merchants need to install readers and terminals. Their staffs are trained on
processing payments using the new system. All these one-time costs are represented by φ . These costs are partly
determined by the nature of the technology, which defines equipment requirements and user interface effectiveness.
M

Hence the net surplus an adopted merchant can get is:

V j = Duϑ j nb M − Pm − φ M
If a merchant does not adopt the electronic payment system, it will get the reservation utility. Without loss of generality, we
assume a zero reservation utility. Here we also denote the overall system benefits as
adopt the electronic payment system if and only if

B M = nb M . Therefore, a merchant will

V j = Duϑ j B M − Pm − φ M ≥ 0
4. USER AND MERCHANT INTERACTION

Suppose the marginal user and merchant (i.e. the user and merchant who is indifferent between adopting the system and
staying without it) are of type θˆ and ϑˆ . By uniform distributions of

θi

and ϑ j :

Du = 1 − θˆ and Dm = 1 − ϑˆ
By simple computation, zero utilities for the marginal user and the marginal merchant will imply:

⎧
Pu + φ U
=
−
D
1
⎪ u
BU Dm
⎪
⎨
M
⎪ D = 1 − Pm + φ
⎪⎩ m
B M Du
The two equations are the best response functions of the two markets (users and merchants). Denote the user-side normalized

Pu + φ U
Pm + φ M
cost of adoption
by ru , and the merchant-side normalized cost of adoption
by rm . Solving the above
BU
BM
two equation gives:

Dm =

(1 − rm + ru ) ± (1 − rm + ru ) 2 − 4ru
2

(1 − ru + rm ) ± (1 − ru + rm ) 2 − 4rm
Du =
2
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In general, there are two solutions for

Du and Dm . Graphically, the two best response functions will intersect as below:

Dm

ru

1

rm

Merchant
User

ru
1

Du

rm
Figure 2: Interaction of Users and Merchants

From Figure 2 we can see that there is a minimum level of user (merchant) acceptance required to have any positive merchant
(user) acceptance. We call these levels the survival masses. It is interesting to see that the merchant-side (user-side) survival
masses (i.e. the minimum required level of user (merchant) acceptance) is determined by the normalized cost of adoption of
the merchant (user) market while the equilibrium merchant and user demands are determined by the normalized costs of
adoption of both sides of the market.
The survival masses are the minimum user and merchant demands needed for a market of the micro-payment to exist. Figure
3 summarized this phenomenon.
However, simply attaining the survival masses cannot guarantee a stable market. There are two intersection points of the two
best response functions. Both are possible equilibrium points. One corresponds to low acceptance levels while other
corresponds to high acceptance levels.
When taking a closer look at the solution, we can see that only the high acceptance level point is a stable equilibrium. The
market will automatically go back to the high equilibrium point given any small deviations due to some shocks.
The low equilibrium point may be interpreted as the point of critical mass. A small deviation below this point will cause the
acceptance levels to go to zero. If the deviation is above, acceptance levels automatically go to the high equilibrium point due
to market forces. Any network size below the critical mass will have negative expectations dominant and the acceptance level
tends to go to zero, while any network size above will ignite positive expectations and the acceptance level goes to a very
high level without much difficulty – exactly the process described by Shapiro and Varian (1999).
In a nutshell, a level of survival mass is required for a market to exist while a level of critical mass has to be exceeded to have
a stable market.
The lower bound of equilibrium acceptance levels can also be established.
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Dm = 0

0

Du =

Dm > 0

Du = 0

0

Dm =

1

Pm + φ M
BM
Du > 0

1

Pu + φ U
BU

Figure 3: Survival Mass Behaviour of the User and Merchant Markets

Proposition 1: The optimal user and merchant acceptance levels are both above 50%:

1
1
*
*
Du > , Dm >
2
2
Proof: Please refer to appendix for proof details.
To have micro-payment system based market (in other words, at any Nash equilibrium), the optimal acceptance levels for
both sides of the market (user and merchant) has to be greater than 50%. This is the critical acceptance level that has to be
exceeded for the market to be stable.
5. PRICING DECISION IN A MONOPOLY MARKET

In stage one, the system provider offers prices to users and merchants. The system provider selects prices to maximize profit.
Assume that there are only fixed costs and we drop the fixed cost notation. Hence the profit function is:

π = Pu Du + Pm Dm
It is widely observed that merchants have a greater incentive to adopt the micro-payment system, since the cost savings are
great:
Assumption 1: Merchants, if adopting the micro-payment system, have more benefits than users. That is,

B M > BU .

It usually costs much more for merchants to adopt the system, since it involves installing the necessary equipments and
training the staff to use it. The users on the other hand only need to get the card and learn how to use it:
Assumption 2: It costs more for merchants than users to adopt the micro-payment system. That is,

φ M > φU .

The two assumptions simply represent market facts and thus have face validity.
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5.1 Interior Solution

Proposition 2: Given the conditions below:

BU >

(i)

BM

(ii)

φM

(iii)

>

BM
;
2
1 BU
;
2 φU

BU > 4φ M ;

, there exists a unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. The optimal price and acceptance levels for the user and merchant
side of the market are given by:
*

Du = α

1 BU α 2 − BU α − B M α + φ M
*
Dm = − (
)
BMα
2
1 BU (1 − α )( BU α 2 − BU α − B M α + φ M )
Pu = − (
) −φU
M
B α
2
*

1 BU α 2 − BU α − B M α + φ M
*
Pm = (1 + (
)) B M α − φ M
Mα
2
B
where

α

is the second largest root of the equation:

f ( x)
= 3( BU ) 2 x 4 − 4 BU ( BU + B M ) x 3 + (( BU ) 2 + ( B M ) 2 + 2 B M BU + 2φ M BU − 4φ U B M ) x 2 − (φ M ) 2
=0
Proof: For proof details, please refer to appendix.
The interpretation of conditions i-iii is as follows. There is a market for the micro-payment system if the user-side system
benefit is large enough relative to the merchant-side (condition (i)), the merchant side market has a high enough benefit-tocost ratio relative to the user side (condition (ii)), and the user-side benefit, relative to the merchant-side adoption cost, is
high enough (condition (iii)).
Achieving the three conditions through adjusting market parameters, on the other hand, is not that simple. For instance,
surprisingly, lowering the user-side adoption cost, instead of decreasing the lower bound condition requirement, will increase
the lower bound requirement of condition (ii). Thus contrary to expectations, lowering the user-side adoption cost alone will
not help enable the market. Table 1 details the various effects of market parameters on equilibrium conditions.
Conditions for Equilibrium

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

U

User-side System Benefit ( B )
Merchant-side System Benefit ( B

M

0

User-side Adoption Cost ( φ )
U

Merchant-side Adoption Cost ( φ

0

)

M

)

0

0

Table 1: Impact of Market Parameters on the Conditions for Equilibrium
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5.2 Boundary Solution

Proposition 3: To achieve full acceptance level for either side of the market, subsidization is required.
Proof: By the inverse demand functions,
*

*

*

*

Pu = −φ U < 0 ⇔ Du = 1 and Pm = −φ M < 0 ⇔ Dm = 1 . [QED]
To achieve full acceptance level for either side of the market, subsidization is required. Hence, it is not feasible for the system
provider to have full acceptance levels for both sides of the market.
6. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION

Using a parsimonious model of two-sided network externalities, we analyse the interaction of users and merchants and the
strategy of a system provider in the context of micro-payment. Our results have important managerial insights for micropayment system markets, and help managers to better understand business models in the digital economy that show two sided
network externalities.
Implications

There is a “survival mass” of merchants and users for the market to exist and a “critical mass” for the acceptance levels to
take off and remain stable. There is also a lower bound, which equals to 50%, for the user and merchant demands. This is the
critical acceptance level that has to be achieved.
The Octopus card system attained acceptance levels of more than 50% on both sides of the market right from the beginning.
The initial participation of the five major public transportation operators guaranteed the necessary merchant and user
demands.
The relationship between market parameters and the existence of a market for the micro-payment system is complicated.
Improving system benefits of either users or merchants has a mixed effect in achieving the conditions for existence of
equilibrium. Improving the user side adoption costs may even prohibit a market to exist. Independently considering
improving system benefits and/or adoption costs of either market side does not help. It is the complex relationship among
market parameters that matters.
This sheds lights on why micro-payment projects, like Visa Cash and Mondex, that are supported by large firms did not take
off. Thinking of market parameters independently kills them. For instance, in a large scale pilot project for Visa Cash and
Mondex (Hove, 2000), the system provider tried to get the conditions for equilibrium by lowering user adoption costs. From
Table 1, we see that such efforts will take the situation further away from the condition required for the existence of a micropayment system based market.
Finally, to achieve full acceptance level for either side of the market, subsidization is required. Hence, it is not feasible for the
system provider to have full acceptance levels for both sides of the market. In fact, no such situation is observed from real
practice.
Future Direction

Our model does not consider the duopoly case. Future research may develop duopoly models to investigate competitive
decisions of system providers offering different technologies. Researchers may also consider whether it is possible to have
different system providers serving different market segments and if a first mover has any advantages over new entries. It will
also be interesting to see if the divide-and-conquer strategy is a good one in different market structures.
Finally, researchers may further investigate the institutional question. What institutional settings will be optimal for micropayment systems? In the credit card market, and also Mondex and Visa Cash, the payment system is owned by an
independent firm. For the Octopus card, it is owned by the public transportation operators who are merchants themselves.
This difference in institutional settings could be an explanation for success. In additions, the Octopus card – the most
successful micro-payment system so far – operates locally in Hong Kong. The possibility of globalising it like the credit card
will be an interesting question. The authors expect that globalisation may require different institutional settings than local
operations.
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APPENDIX

Proof of Proposition 1:
For the two best response functions to intersect:

Pu + φ U
Pm + φ M
Pu + φ U Pm + φ M
1
⇒
+
<1
<
−
BU
BM
BU
BM
*

*

Optimal acceptance levels Du and Dm are given by the larger root of the following two equations respectively:

Both

f (u ) = 0 = u 2 − (1 −

Pu + φ U Pm + φ M
Pm + φ M
u
+
)
+
BU
BM
BM

g (v) = 0 = v 2 − (1 +

Pu + φ U Pm + φ M
Pu + φ U
v
−
)
+
BU
BM
BU

f (u ) and g (v) are convex.

By

P + φU P + φ M
1
1
1 P + φU P + φ M
f ( ) = g ( ) = ( u U + m M − 1) < 0 as u U + m M < 1 ,
2
2
2 B
B
B
B
1
1
*
*
Du > , Dm > . [QED]
2
2

Proof of Proposition 2:
We prove the proposition in 3 steps:
Step 1: Restate the profit maximization problem using the inverse demand function instead of best response functions, as the
two are mathematically equivalent and the inverse demand function representation is simpler to solve.
Step 2: Solve the problem using first order conditions and get the 4th order polynomial f (x ) . Two of the three second order
conditions (the second partial derivatives with respect to acceptance levels) are clearly satisfied. In verifying the third second
order condition, we first prove that it has positive values by showing that it is a concave function in ( Du , Dm ) and its
boundary points on the ( Du , Dm ) plane all give positive functional values.
Step 3: Prove that only the second largest root of f (x) is the equilibrium solution. Here we use Rolle’s Theorem, which
states that stationary points of a polynomial define the upper and/or lower bound of the value of the corresponding roots. We
show that except the second largest root, all others are out of the range between 50% and 100% acceptances.
Here are the details:
Step 1: The inverse demand functions are:

Pu = (1 − Du ) BU Dm − φ U
Pm = (1 − Dm ) B M Du − φ M
By substituting them into the profit function of the system provider, the optimization becomes:

max(π = ((1 − Du ) BU Dm − φ U ) Du + ((1 − Dm ) B M Du − φ M ) Dm )
Du , Dm

Step 2:
Using the first order conditions:
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*

Du = α
*

Dm = −
where

α

1 BU α 2 − ( BU + B M )α + φ M
2
BMα

is the root of the equation:

f ( x)
= 3( BU ) 2 x 4 − 4 BU ( BU + B M ) x 3 + (( BU ) 2 + ( B M ) 2 + 2 B M BU + 2φ M BU − 4φ U B M ) x 2 − (φ M ) 2
=0
The second order conditions are:

SOC1 =

∂ 2π
= −2 BU Dm < 0
2
∂Du

SOC 2 =

∂ 2π
= −2 B M Du < 0
2
∂Dm

∂ 2π ∂ 2π
∂ 2π 2
)
SOC 3 =
−(
2
2
∂Du ∂Dm
∂Du ∂Dm
= 4 BU B M Du Dm − ((1 − 2 Du ) BU − (1 − 2 Dm ) B M ) 2 > 0
SOC1 and SOC 2 are obviously true. For the last condition, note that
SOC3 is concave in ( Du , Dm ) as:

∂ 2 SOC 3
= −8( BU ) 2 < 0
2
∂Du
∂ 2 SOC 3
= −8( B M ) 2 < 0
2
∂Dm
∂ 2 SOC 3 ∂ 2 SOC 3
∂ 2 SOC 3 2
(
)(
)−(
) = 48( BU B M ) 2 > 0
2
2
∂Dm Du
∂Du
∂Dm
We need to prove that SOC 3 > 0 for possible optimal acceptance levels. The optimal levels lie between 1/2 and 1:

SOC 3 |Du = Dm =1 2 = BU B M > 0
SOC 3 |Du = Dm =1 = 4 BU B M − ( BU + B M ) 2 = ( BU − B M ) 2 > 0
2

SOC 3 |Du =1, Dm =1 2 = 2 BU B M − BU = (2 B M − BU ) BU > 0 since B M > BU
U

M

SOC 3 |Du =1 2, Dm =1 = 2 B B − B

M2

BM
= (2 B − B ) B > 0 as long as B >
2
U

M

M

U
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*

*

Hence, Du , Dm is a solution provided that

BU >

BM
.
2

Step 3:
We proceed to prove that only one of four possible values for

α1 ≥ α 2 ≥ α 3 ≥ α 4
Solving

and

β1 > β 2 > β 3

be roots of

α

is the solution. Let roots of

f ( x) = 0 be

f ' ( x) = 0 .

f ' ( x) = 0 gives x = 0 and:
g ( x)
= 6( BU ) 2 x 2 − 12 BU ( BU + B M ) x + 2(( BU ) 2 + ( B M ) 2 + 2 B M BU + 2φ M BU − 4φ U B M )
=0

g ( 0)
= 2(( BU ) 2 + ( B M ) 2 + 2 B M BU + 2φ M BU − 4φ U B M )
> 2(( BU ) 2 + ( B M ) 2 + 2 B M BU + 2φ U BU − 4φ U BU ) as B M > BU , φ M > φ U
= 2(( BU ) 2 + ( B M ) 2 + 2( B M − φ U ) BU ) > 0 as B M > BU > φ U

1
g( )
2
= 4[8( B M ) 2 − 10( BU ) 2 + 16φ M BU − 8BU B M − 32φ U B M ]
= 4[8 BU B M (

U
BM
BU
BM
M U B
−
−
+
−
1
10
)
16
(
2
)]
φ
φ
BU
BM
φU
φM

< 0 as long as BU >

B M B M 1 BU
>
,
2 φ M 2 φU

g ' ' ( x) = 12( BU ) 2 > 0, i.e., g ( x) is convex,
Therefore,

Solving

β1 >

1
> β 2 > 0 = β3.
2

g ' ( x) = 12( BU ) 2 x − 12 BU ( BU + B M ) = 0 gives x =

By Rolle’s theorem,

1
2

BU + B M
> 1 ⇒ β1 > 1 .
BU

α1 > β 1 > 1, > β 2 > α 3,0 > α 4 . Thus only α 2

is a possible solution. It is the unique solution if

it lies between 1/2 and 1.
To prove that, we first establish the following inequality:

B M − BU > 0 > 4(φ U − φ M ) as B M > BU , φ M > φ U
⇒ B M − 4φ U > BU − 4φ M
⇒ ( B M − 4φ U ) 2 > ( BU − 4φ M ) 2 as long as B M > 4φ U , BU > 4φ M
By

B M > BU and φ M > φ U , BU > 4φ M ⇒ B M > 4φ U .
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1
f( )
2
= 16(4( B M ) 2 − 16φ U B M − ( BU ) 2 − 16(φ M ) 2 + 8φ M BU )
= 16[4 B M ( B M − 4φ U ) − ( BU − 4φ M ) 2 ]
> 16[( B M − 4φ U ) 2 − ( BU − 4φ M ) 2 ]
> 0 since ( B M − 4φ U ) 2 > ( BU − 4φ M ) 2 as long as B M > 4φ U , BU > 4φ M
f (1)
= ( B M ) 2 − 2 BU B M − 4φ U B M + 2φ M BU − (φ M ) 2
= B ( B − 2 B ) − 2φ φ (2
M

M

U

M

U

φ

M

−

BU

φ

U

) − (φ M ) 2

1 BU
B
B
and M >
< 0 as long as B >
2
φ
2 φU
U

Together with the fact that

1>α2 >

M

BM

β1 > 1 >

M

1
> β 2 and β 1 > α 2 > β 2 by Rolle’s Theorem, we can conclude that
2

1
. [QED]
2
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